Nepotism in K–12 school systems—favoring relatives, friends, or personal acquaintances in hiring or promotion—undermines the central promise of public education: that each student is taught and led by the most qualified professionals available. While in some communities this practice has been normalized under the banner of “knowing the right people,” evidence consistently demonstrates that bypassing merit for personal ties harms instructional quality, leadership capacity, morale, retention, and equity (Grissom et al., 2021; Rockoff, 2004). Recent events, along with policy developments at both state and local levels, highlight that this is not a relic of the past but an ongoing challenge affecting classrooms and learning outcomes today (Dao, 2024; Kane, 2024; N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:23A-6.2; Va. Code § 2.2-3119).
Historically, nepotism was entrenched in many districts, particularly in smaller or insular communities. Early reporting from Pennsylvania revealed how widespread it was to find teachers related to administrators or board members, with some districts suspending anti-nepotism rules to accommodate specific hires (Ruder, 2010). Georgia attempted to curb this in 2010 by prohibiting board service if an immediate family member held a principal or central office role, a rule that provoked lawsuits from those affected (Ruder, 2010). In Michigan, even a scandal involving a board member’s son failed to produce a hiring ban; the rationale was that such a policy would limit recruitment (Ruder, 2010). In Santa Clara County, California, a civil grand jury found nepotism “occurring” in 2010 and recommended stronger policies and transparency measures, prompting local rules against direct supervisory relationships between relatives (Mountain View Voice, 2010a; Santa Clara County Superior Court, 2010). These episodes foreshadow the tension that persists—valuing local ties while owing the public impartiality.
Recent years have provided vivid examples of these dynamics. In Phoenix, Arizona, internal reviews in 2023–2024 uncovered a pattern of promotions, salary adjustments, and reassignments disproportionately benefiting employees related by blood or marriage, many of which bypassed normal procedures (Dao, 2024). The district estimated that these actions cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, prompting leadership changes and the institution of annual “talent audits” and stricter documentation requirements (Dao, 2024). In Passaic, New Jersey, a 2024 whistleblower lawsuit alleged that relatives of board members were chosen over more qualified applicants in violation of state policy (Kane, 2024). Charter networks have also faced scrutiny; investigative reporting on College Achieve detailed family-linked contracting and compensation practices that triggered state action in 2024–2025 (New Jersey Commissioner of Education, 2025). Earlier cases, such as a Broward County, Florida transportation department head with a web of relatives and friends on staff, illustrate that the pattern is neither new nor confined to one sector (NBC Miami, 2011).
The reason this matters so deeply is rooted in decades of research on teacher and principal effectiveness. Teacher quality is among the most important school-based predictors of student achievement, with students taught by more effective educators gaining substantially more each year than peers assigned to less effective ones (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006; Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005). If hiring is influenced by personal connection rather than competence, the probability of selecting a less capable candidate increases, lowering the average quality of instruction students receive (Frontiers in Education, 2024). Over time, even small decreases in average teacher effectiveness translate into measurable learning losses, particularly for students with fewer external supports (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006).
Principal quality has a similarly profound influence. Effective school leaders recruit, support, and retain strong teachers, build cohesive cultures, and set clear instructional priorities (Grissom et al., 2021). In high-poverty schools, the difference between an effective and ineffective principal can be equivalent to months of additional learning (Branch et al., 2013, as summarized in OEP, 2025). Nepotistic leadership appointments risk placing individuals without the requisite skills into positions where their decisions reverberate through the entire school. Moreover, leaders appointed through favoritism may perpetuate the same practices, shielding protégés from accountability and privileging loyalty over performance, as the Phoenix audit revealed (Dao, 2024).
The harm of nepotism often appears first in the culture of a school. Research from multiple sectors confirms that nepotism diminishes perceptions of fairness, erodes trust, fosters cynicism, and increases intentions to leave among non-favored employees (Topsakal & Özcan, 2023; Ramez, 2023). In schools, where collaborative culture is essential to improvement, this loss of trust can be devastating. Teachers who believe advancement is reserved for insiders may withdraw discretionary effort, decline leadership opportunities, or seek employment elsewhere. The resulting turnover is costly both financially and pedagogically, disrupting continuity for students and replacing experienced educators with novices (Grissom et al., 2021). Educators themselves have described how the belief that “who you know” outweighs “what you know” was the deciding factor in leaving a district (Chennault, 2023). Even competent hires cannot offset the damage caused when colleagues perceive the process as illegitimate.
Nepotism also compounds inequities. Hiring through personal networks tends to reproduce the demographics of those networks, which can mean fewer opportunities for candidates from underrepresented racial, cultural, or socioeconomic groups (Grissom et al., 2021). Applicants whose families lack local connections may be excluded despite strong qualifications, while those already embedded in the system gain an advantage unrelated to merit (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). The result is a workforce that is less diverse in experience and perspective, which can narrow the range of role models and instructional approaches available to students. For students in under-resourced schools, these inequities can deepen existing achievement gaps (Rivkin et al., 2005).
Policy responses vary. Some states have explicit statutes that restrict such practices. Virginia’s conflict-of-interest law prohibits school board employees from supervising immediate family members and sets additional boundaries for board and superintendent conduct (Va. Code § 2.2-3119). New Jersey requires boards to adopt nepotism policies with clear definitions and exceptions only under narrowly defined conditions, applying similar standards to charter schools (N.J. Admin. Code §§ 6A:23A-6.2, 6A:23A-22.10). Legislative proposals in 2024 aimed to further tighten these rules (New Jersey Legislature, 2024). Locally, many boards have adopted rules prohibiting direct supervisory relationships between relatives and requiring public votes for exceptions, a measure recommended by the Santa Clara grand jury (Mountain View Voice, 2010a; Santa Clara County Superior Court, 2010). Where misconduct has been uncovered, as in Phoenix, districts have added safeguards like competitive interview requirements, formal salary adjustment procedures, and annual compliance reviews (Dao, 2024).
Enforcement remains a challenge. Rules that depend on disclosure can be undermined by nondisclosure, and broad exception clauses can become loopholes. Definitions of “family” and “supervision” vary, and charter governance structures may leave gaps in oversight (N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:23A-22.10; New Jersey Commissioner of Education, 2025). Effective prevention blends policy with culture: fair and transparent procedures, board-level scrutiny, public reporting, and leadership accountability for equitable hiring outcomes (Grissom et al., 2021).
The most effective strategies combine procedural rigor and cultural reinforcement. Blind screening for initial application reviews can reduce bias, while structured interviews and scoring rubrics create a defensible record of why each candidate was chosen (Grissom et al., 2021). Public reporting of hires and promotions that involve family relationships increases transparency. Aligning leadership evaluations with adherence to fair hiring protocols, retention of effective staff, and equitable distribution of qualified teachers reinforces that merit-based hiring is not optional.
It is important to note that having family members in the same district is not inherently harmful when the process is fair. Many excellent educators follow relatives into the profession and thrive. The distinction lies in process integrity: when a family member is chosen because they are the best candidate after a competitive search, there is no loss to students; when they are chosen simply because of their relationship, students pay the cost in reduced opportunity. With multiple states tightening their codes and recent cases drawing public attention, the path forward is clear.
Over the last several decades, research has consistently underscored that the two most powerful levers for improving student learning are teacher quality and principal quality (Grissom et al., 2021; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). Both depend on effective recruitment and selection. Districts cannot compensate indefinitely for poor hires, and they cannot cultivate a strong professional culture if the prevailing message is that advancement depends on personal connections. If the mission is to maximize student learning, the means must be grounded in merit. Any other approach is, in effect, a hidden budget cut paid in the currency of lost growth.
References
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Chennault, A. (2023, March 1). I’m an education “nepo baby”: Nepotism has benefits in education. The Educator’s Room. https://theeducatorsroom.com/im-an-education-nepo-baby
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